Introduction
The Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) provides around 60% of the global tuna catch [37] , with a total of just over 2.7 million metric tonnes (mt) caught in 2016 ─ of which around 69,000 mt was South Pacific albacore. While the South Pacific albacore catch represents less than 3% of the total catch from the WCPO, it is nonetheless a species of primary importance in the longline fishery of a number of Small Island Developing States (SIDS) that lie outside the 'main' tropical fishing areas of the WCPO. The southern longline fishery below 10°S stretches across the exclusive economic zones of 18 Pacific Island countries and territories, including Australia and New Zealand. However, as the significance of the fisheries of Australia and New Zealand to the national economy is relatively small (i.e. total fisheries and aquaculture production in Australia makes up less than 0.2% of Gross Domestic Product [1, 12] ), the focus of the discussion for this paper will be on the other SIDS for which the status of the albacore stock is central to the economic performance of their domestic longline fleets and the ability of their governments to generate income, employment and other economic benefits from their fisheries and related sectors.
The Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) has adopted a limit reference point for the South Pacific albacore stock at 20% of unfished spawning stock biomass levels (20%SB F=0 ), where SB F=0 is calculated as the average stock size that would have been present in the absence of fishing over the latest 10 years of the stock assessment [33] . Based upon the results of the most recent stock assessment for South Pacific albacore [7] , which reported the 2013 stock status, the 11th Scientific Committee meeting report noted that "despite the fact that the stock is not overfished and overfishing is not occurring, SC11 … [recommends] that longline fishing mortality and longline catch be reduced to avoid further decline in the vulnerable biomass so that economically viable catch rates can be maintained". As stochastic projection analyses indicated that further declines in the stock would occur under status quo effort conditions, the Scientific Committee noted "there is a 19% chance that the South Pacific albacore stock will fall below the limit reference point by 2033 if 2014 fishing effort levels continue, and that overall decreases in vulnerable biomass (a proxy for longline CPUE) of 14% would also be likely to occur" [30] . This prognosis led to management consideration of biological and economic objectives for the southern longline fishery that targets South Pacific albacore. International management objectives frequently focus upon maintaining stocks at, or restoring stocks to, levels that can produce the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) [38] . However, for South Pacific albacore this implies a stock size below the limit reference point (SB MSY is approximately 14% SB F=0 ), a significant risk of the stock falling below the LRP if SB MSY were achieved on average, and a 65% reduction in catch rates [18] . Given concerns over continued stock declines and associated catch rate reductions even under status quo conditions, a key objective proposed within the WCPFC 2nd Management Objectives Workshop [34] focused on reducing the risk of the stock falling below the limit reference point, increasing catch rates and moving toward Maximum Economic Yield (MEY) [5] .
There are very limited number of fisheries in the world that are managed to MEY or include economic considerations in their management plan. Examining fisheries with best practices around the world, Sainsbury [27] only identified the federally managed fisheries in Australia to have incorporated economic considerations in the setting of limit or target reference points for biomass or fishing mortality of retained species. Australia is amongst the few countries in the world that have specifically adopted MEY as a target reference point (TRP), within the Australian Fisheries Harvest Policy [24] , with B MEY either specifically estimated, [4, 10] or as a proxy related to MSY of B MEY ∼ 1.2B MSY [17] . Across the Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs), economic targets are even less common. Currently, the only tuna stock managed by a RFMO that has an interim TRP with economic considerations in place is the skipjack tuna stock of the WCPFC [31, 32] . The MSY identified for the skipjack stock at the time was only 0.26SB F=0,2002-2011 , almost half the level of the interim TRP that was adopted. One of the key reasons for maintaining a larger biomass at the target was to maintain volume, size composition and value of catches in real terms at around the prevailing levels [31] . This compares to the adoption of a biologically based MSY target for skipjack tuna in the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) and the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC). Part of the purpose of this paper is to highlight the importance of economic considerations in setting fisheries management targets through examining the impacts on fishery profitability from different stock recovery options that achieve the same candidate TRP for the South Pacific albacore stock.
For the southern longline fishery in the WCPO, work identifying candidate TRPs that achieved the desired fishery performance has been undertaken [18, 21] . Significant improvements in economic outcomes for the fishery could be generated. Achieving MEY within the fishery would require severe reductions in effort, incompatible with other management objectives for employment within the local fishery sector or the level of vessel licensing revenue. Sub-optimal but improved economic performance levels that achieved a 10% revenue margin over economic costs, or revenues equal to the economic costs, could be obtained with less severe reductions in effort. However, achieving those levels still required reductions in fishing levels to increase the albacore stock size from those currently observed, and achieve higher levels of CPUE.
Subsequent to this, members of the Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) proposed an interim TRP for the South Pacific albacore stock of 45% SB F=0 . This is around 10% higher than the stock levels estimated for 2013 and was proposed on the basis that achieving the TRP was predicted to return catch rates to levels similar to those seen in the years immediately prior to 2010 when effort in the fishery began a period of rapid growth. However, rebuilding a stock to a given TRP can be achieved through many approaches. As noted by Dichmont et al. [4] , however, the pathway through which the fishery transitions from a given level to a more profitable one can have very different economic implications for the fisheries exploiting the stock.
To support further discussions of candidate TRPs for the South Pacific albacore stock and southern longline fishery, and to develop scientific approaches that enable the examination of the inherent tradeoffs between different pathways involved in achieving a given TRP, this paper examines the potential consequences for the southern longline fishery of implementing two distinct effort reduction regimes that are aimed at rebuilding the albacore stock to the interim TRP proposed by FFA members of 45%SB F=0 within 20 years. The analysis does not address the appropriateness of this TRP but simply uses it as an illustrative example.
Material and methods
The analysis was undertaken as a three-step process:
1. Identification of the effort reduction regimes required to achieve the proposed interim TRP of 45%SB F=0 within 20 years through either a one-off reduction or through a phased reduction. These two scenarios are used as contrasting examples of management interventions that can achieve the same goal. 2. Estimation of the annual catch of albacore and other species in the southern longline fishery over the next 20 years under the two identified effort reduction regimes and the maintenance of status quo effort levels. 3. Estimation of real annual rent generated in the southern longline fishery over the next 20 years and the cumulated net present value (NPV) of this rent under the maintenance of status quo effort levels and the two identified effort reduction regimes.
2.1. Identification of the effort reduction regimes required to achieve the proposed interim TRP Two types of effort reduction regimes were identified using the iterative process described below. Both effort reduction regimes had the objective of achieving the proposed interim TRP in 20 years. These were:
• a one-off 38% reduction in effort implemented in the first year; and • a phased reduction under which effort is reduced by 2.5% each year from the 2nd year onwards.
These reductions were scaled off the effort level within each longline fleet in 2013. The results of these management actions were compared to the 'status quo', whereby effort within the fishery was maintained at 2013 levels.
The level of effort reduction required under each regime was estimated using deterministic 20 year projections based upon the 2015 assessment for South Pacific albacore [7] , and an iterative process whereby different effort reduction levels were modelled until the stock achieved the TRP in the 20th year. Within the stock assessment, 8 combined longline fleets are modelled within each of the assessment regions within the southern WCPFC Convention Area (WCP-CA) (Fig. 1) . Projections were performed with effort in all eight longline fisheries being reduced equally. The fishing level of the three troll fisheries (the only non-longline fisheries in the assessment model, and which take less than 5% of the total weight of the catch) were assumed to remain constant.
2.2.
Estimation of the annual catch of albacore and other species in the southern longline fishery While South Pacific albacore is the target species of the southern longline fishery, other economically valuable species are also caught, including tropical tuna species. To estimate the revenue arising from each alternative management scenario, we therefore take the financial value of these 'bycatch' species into account. This avoids the issue of allocating costs to an individual species when multiple species are caught together [23] .
Albacore
Projections for each of the effort reduction regimes and for the maintenance of status quo effort were run across a subset of nine assessment runs from the 2015 South Pacific albacore stock assessment to capture existing uncertainty in our knowledge of South Pacific albacore biology. Those runs covered combinations of alternative stock recruitment relationship steepness assumptions and assumed values of the natural mortality rate.
Within the deterministic projections, future recruitments were assumed at an average level as defined by the stock recruitment relationship for a given underlying adult biomass. While future uncertainty is captured by projecting across the 'grid' of assessment models that capture the alternative population dynamics described above, results of projections therefore represent those arising 'on average' under those alternative assumptions. Catchability, which can have a trend in the historical component of the model, was assumed to remain constant in the projection period at the level estimated in the terminal year of the assessment model. Reference points of relevance to South Pacific albacore have been defined as a percentage of the adult biomass level that would have occurred in the absence of fishing, averaged over a rolling 10-year period (SB F=0 ), i.e. adult biomass in future year y was related to the SB F=0 averaged over the period y-10 to y-1 (e.g. SB 2032 /SB F=0,2022-2031 ).
The percentage unfished level was calculated within each of the nine assessment model runs to ensure consistency with the underlying biological assumptions. The resulting nine stock trajectories were averaged, weighted according to WCPFC Scientific Committee decisions on their a priori biological plausibility ( Table 1 ). The run considered most biologically plausible was therefore given the most weight, and results from runs considered less biologically plausible were 'downweighted'.
From each of the scenarios, the annual South Pacific albacore catch taken in the principal Pacific Island southern longline fishery was estimated. This fishery was defined as the longline fishery operating south of 10°S within regions 2, 3, 5 and 6 of the assessment model (Fig. 1 ).
Other species
Two approaches were used to estimate the level of 'other species' catch under a specified management regime. For yellowfin and bigeye, an approach consistent with the regional bio-economic model developed by Kirchner et al. [9] was used. For billfish, shark and 'other' species catches, for which a stock assessment model does not exist, a regression approach was used to estimate the catch taken in the southern longline fishery [21] .
Yellowfin and bigeye.
The yellowfin and bigeye stock assessments used by the WPCFC [3, 6] were used to estimate future catches of these species. As the 2014 bigeye and yellowfin assessments estimated stock status up to 2012, all fisheries were projected through 
Table 1
Nine stock assessment model runs from the 2015 assessment selected to capture uncertainty in current conditions and knowledge of South Pacific albacore biology, and weighting values assigned to each run for analysis of results. Mortality refers to natural mortality, the removal of fish from the stock due to causes not associated with fishing (e.g. disease, competition, old age, predation, pollution or other natural factors). Steepness is defined as the fraction of recruitment from a virgin population obtained when the spawners are at 20% of the virgin level, and directly relates to productivity and yield. to 2013 with the relevant effort multiplier to ensure they had the same starting year as that for albacore. Being primarily tropical stocks, the assessments for bigeye and yellowfin encompass a much larger geographic area, from 50°N to 50°S. From the updated 2013 bigeye and yellowfin status, therefore, the effort in fisheries equivalent to the southern longline fishery specifically (the southern region of those assessment models) was scaled consistent with each scenario examined for South Pacific albacore. The annual species catches within those matching fisheries under those scenarios was then estimated. One feature of the tropical tuna assessments in the southern region is that they include significant catches from longline fleets specifically targeting tropical tunas in the latitudinal band between the equator and 10-15°S. At the wider regional scale of these tropical assessment models, they therefore do not directly represent the southern longline fleet targeting albacore. As estimates of tropical tuna catch levels within the southern longline fleet were therefore inflated, for this evaluation the bigeye and yellowfin stock assessments were used to capture the stock dynamics arising from the southern longline fishery management interventions identified. Catches were then adjusted to be consistent with the potential catch from the albacore-targeting fleet component only. To do this, the 20-year time series of catches of these species were first estimated, and the relative annual change in each of yellowfin and bigeye catch levels from 2013 calculated for the 20-year projection period. Those relative changes were then applied to regression-based estimates of yellowfin and bigeye catch in 2013 derived specifically from the South Pacific albacore targeting fleet, based upon the projected albacore catch level.
2.2.2.2.
Billfish, sharks and other species. Annual albacore catch levels from logsheet information over the period 1990-2012 by longline fleet were related to annual catches of combined billfish, sharks, and a grouped 'other species' category, through linear regression. These regressions were used to calculate annual bycatch levels of each group based upon the annual South Pacific albacore catch by fleet estimated within the deterministic stock projections. Linear regressions were fitted to the natural logarithms of the catch data using the lm() function in R. Where diagnostics indicated that there was no clear relationship between the level of albacore catch taken by a fleet and the corresponding bycatch species level, a constant catch of that species or group was assumed, being the average over the time period. Oceanic whitetip and silky sharks were excluded from the shark catch data to mimic the future impact of recent non-retention conservation and management measures (CMMs) [35, 36] .
Estimation of real annual rent generated in the southern longline fishery and the cumulated Net Present Value of this rent
Annual fishery economic rent is calculated as fishery revenue less economic costs where revenue is the product of species catch and exvessel prices summed across all species groupings and economic costs are the product of the level of effort expended in the fishery and the estimated economic cost of the production of a unit of effort. Economic costs are taken from SPC [18] and reflect the costs related to actual vessel operation (e.g. fuel, bait and crew wages), other cash costs (e.g. insurance and administration) and capital costs, that is, depreciation and the opportunity cost of capital. Opportunity cost of capital reflects the return that could have been earnt from an alternative investment of similar risk. Costs related to transporting catch to markets (e.g. freight and marketing, commissions and taxes) are excluded, as are access/ licensing fees which represent a transfer between harvesters and resource owners. Annual fishery economic rents illustrate the implications for fishery profitability along the path of each scenario. Also calculated is the cumulated Net Present Value (NPV) of annual fishery economic rents over the 20-year period, providing an indication of the current value of the rents generated over the future period.
The assumed unit prices for the catch of each species, expressed in 2014 US dollars, are provided in Table 2 . These real prices are assumed to remain constant across all levels of catch as historically, despite some short-term fluctuations, long-term trends for real prices of longline caught product have been flat despite significant changes in the catch of these species [25] . Furthermore, a statistical analysis using price, catch and other macroeconomic data from 2000 to 2014 was conducted to examine the short and long run relationship between the volume and price for albacore tuna landed in the WCPO. The results showed that there is insufficient evidence to suggest any co-integrated/sustainable long run price dependence on albacore catch (i.e. no statistically significant price elasticity was detected). Economic costs per unit effort is initially set at $1.10 per hook reflecting estimated costs under status quo effort levels following SPC [18] . However, under the effort reduction regimes, economic costs per unit effort vary according to the assumed relationship between effort reductions and the displacement of vessels from the fishery. Economic costs relate to both costs that directly vary with the number of hooks set (e.g. bait and fuel) and those that do not (e.g. annual costs such as insurance and administration, and capital costs such as depreciation). The latter costs, referred to as annual fixed cost, are estimated to represent 33.5% of the total cost based on the averages reported for the South Pacific albacore fisheries in Fiji and Australia [2, 29] . Fixed costs include administrative costs, leasing and rent, insurance, interest paid, repairs and maintenance, depreciation and opportunity cost of capital, evaluated at 15% of capital assets. This means that if the number of vessels in the fishery declines at a slower rate than the reduction in effort, the average cost per hook will increase as the annual fixed costs remains constant but is spread over fewer hooks. By way of illustration, for example, if following the 38% reduction in effort, vessel numbers in the fishery fall by 3.8% (i.e. the rate of decline in vessel numbers is 10% of the reduction in effort) the number of hooks set per vessel will decline 35.6% (i.e. vessels will, on average, set 64.4% of the hooks they set before the effort reduction). In this situation the average annual fixed cost per hook will increase by 55.2% as they are spread over 35.6% less hooks (i.e. 1/0.644-1). As fixed costs represent 33.5% of economic costs, the economic costs per hook will increase by 18.5% (i.e. [0.335 +0.665 * 0.644]/0.664-1) compared with before the effort reduction.
The analysis first assumes that the number of vessels in the fishery will decline in direct proportion to the imposed effort reduction. That is, after the effort reduction has occurred effort per vessel remains the same as before the effort reduction, as does the cost per unit effort. However, this assumption may not hold unless enforced by other management measures particularly in the case of the one-off 38% reduction in effort. Therefore, to examine the sensitivity of results to this assumption, the implications of a range of slower vessel exit rates were also examined. This is done through varying the cost per hook from the initial $1.10 cost per hook (i.e., the cost level before any reduction in effort takes place). In particular, slower vessel exit rates of 10% and 0% (i.e. no vessels exit) are used as illustrative examples. The vessel exit rate under which the one-off reduction would yield the same level of NPV as the phased reduction is also identified. Furthermore, as the cost structure of the fishery often differ between fleets, due to fluctuations in fuel prices and government subsidies, the impact of different initial cost levels was examined in additional sensitivity analyses.
Results

South Pacific albacore stock projections
Across the nine stock assessment models used within the analysis, the weighted average stock status in 2013 (the last year of the assessment) was 41%SB F=0 , while a continuation of status quo (2013) effort over a 20 year period results in the estimated albacore stock declining by a further 20-34%SB F=0 (Fig. 2) . The proposed albacore interim TRP represents a stock size that is 10% larger than that estimated for 2013 and 32% greater than the stock's estimated size in 20 years under the maintenance of 2013 effort levels.
The effort reductions identified that achieved the desired TRP in 20 years were: 38% for the one-off early reduction, and a 2.5% effort reduction per year for the phased reduction. The resulting trajectories of the stock rebuilding varied significantly. The 38% one-off reduction rebuilds the albacore stock to close to the proposed TRP in around 5-7 years with the stock size then increasing marginally throughout the rest of the 20-year period as the stock reached equilibrium with the prevailing effort. In contrast the 2.5% phased reduction led to a fairly constant rate of rebuilding, with the stock finally reaching the proposed TRP in the 20th year (Fig. 2) . At that point, total longline effort was 47% lower than 2013 levels.
Principal Pacific Island southern longline fishery projections
The longline effort changes and resulting stock dynamics presented above reflect projected outcomes for the South Pacific albacore stock across the whole albacore assessment area. Here we examine the implications of implementing the effort reduction regimes on the level of catch taken, and economic rents generated, in the principal Pacific Island southern longline fishery (assessment regions 2, 3, 5 and 6, see Fig. 1 ).
Catch
Both effort reduction regimes result in lower albacore and total catch throughout the 20-year period compared with the maintenance of the status quo effort (Fig. 3) . However, the temporal pattern varies significantly between the two regimes. The one-off cut initially results in significantly lower catch levels compared to that under status quo effort levels (this difference is referred to as the forgone catch), with around 16,000mt of albacore catch forgone in the first year of the effort cut. In the following 6 years as catch increases, the level of forgone catch declines. By year 7 the forgone albacore catch is reduced to around 6,700mt. This is then followed by further small incremental reductions in forgone catch over the next 13 years, and by the 20th year the albacore catch is only around 5,500mt less than if the status quo was maintained. In contrast, the phased reduction sees the level of albacore catch forgone increasing year on year throughout the 20-year period compared with status quo effort, to reach 9,800mt in the final year. The cumulative forgone catch for the one-off cut over the 20-year period compared with status quo effort is around 143,000 mt for albacore (262,000 mt for total catch). For the phased reduction this is 98,000 mt for albacore (175,000 mt for total catch).
Fishery rent
Real annual rents and the NPV of those rents over the 20-year period under the two effort reduction regimes are compared with those generated under status quo effort. The initial scenario examined follows that of SPC and Pilling et al. [18, 21] ─ that is, where the economic costs per unit of effort is set at $1.10/hook and vessels are assumed to withdraw from the fishery at the same rate at which effort is reduced. The effect of this assumption is that cost per unit of effort remains constant as effort is reduced. In effect, vessels that remain in the fishery are assumed to continue expending the same level of effort (i.e. set the same number of hooks) despite the reduction in total effort, such that the effort reduction occurs through vessels exiting the fishery. Under this assumption, the reduction in total economic costs associated with the production of a lower level of effort compared with maintaining status quo effort levels is greater than the value of the catch that is forgone (i.e. forgone fishery revenue) across all years. In other words, effort reductions lead to an immediate increase in fishery rent. For example, the 38% effort reduction reduces total economic costs by around $112 million each year whereas the value of the catch declines by only 32% or around $80 million in the first year, resulting in an increase in rents of around $33 million (Fig. 4) .
Comparing the relative economic performance of the two effort reduction regimes, the one-off 38% effort reduction increases fishery rent by around $33 million in the first year, which then doubles over the next 6 years before increasing marginally to $68 million per annum by the end of the 20-year period. Increases in fishery rent measured under relative economic performance is made in comparison to that would have been generated under maintaining status quo effort. In contrast, the phased reduction sees a gradual increase in rent of around $3 ─ 4 million per annum over the period to reach $75 million in the final year. The NPV of the cumulated rents generated is higher for the one-off 38% effort reduction regardless of the discount rate used. This is owing to higher rents generated under the one-off cut scenario throughout the 20-year period, with the exception of the final two years when biomass vulnerable to the gear (and hence CPUE) is higher under the phased reduction scenario even though the spawning biomass is at similar levels. Using a discount rate of 5%, the NPV of the additional annual rents earned relative to the status quo effort for the one-off cut is $786 million over the 20-year period. This is nearly double that for the phased reduction, at $400 million. Nonetheless, under the assumptions outlined both effort reduction regimes increased fishery rent compared to status quo effort and achieved the TRP within 20 years.
Sensitivity analyses 3.2.3.1. Vessel exit rates.
To assess the implications of a scenario where the size of the fleet does not adjust in direct proportion to the effort reduction, the assumed rate at which vessels exit the fishery each year was varied. The first scenario examined was where under the 38% oneoff effort reduction, vessels exit the fishery at a rate of 3.8% of the size of the fleet before the effort reduction (or at one-tenth of the effort reduction). This means that in the year that effort is cut, the average number of hooks set for each vessel declines by 35.6%, which increases the cost per hook by 18.5% to $1.30. Over the next 9 years, as the number of vessels continues to decline, the number of hooks set per vessel increases and cost per hook declines back to the same level as before the effort reduction. Under this scenario, in the first year rents are around $1 million less than under status quo effort with cost now declining by around $79 million (compared with by $112 million previously) and revenues, as before, down around $80 million (Fig. 5) . Nonetheless, by the second year rents are once again higher than that under status quo effort and the NPV of rents over the 20-year period using a discount rate of 5% is around $638 million higher. Even if no vessels leave the fishery and effort per vessel falls by 38%, driving the cost per hook 20.5% higher, the NPV of fishery rents over the 20-year period are estimated to be $303 million higher under the one-off reduction than maintaining status quo effort. This indicates that the fishery would be able to generate increased levels of rent if effort was significantly reduced, even if this effort reduction occurs solely through a reduction in effort (number of hooks deployed) produced by each vessel.
Comparing the outcomes under the two effort reduction regimes, for the NPV of annual rents under the one-off cut to be the same as that under the phased reduction where vessels exit in proportion to the effort reduction (i.e. vessels under the phased reduction scenario continue to set the same number of hooks), the vessel exit rate under the one-off reduction needs to be below 0.9%. That is to say, so long as the fleet size reduces by around 1% of its initial size per year, then the NPV of the rent produced in the fishery will be greater under the one-off reduction than that generated by a 2.5% year-on-year effort reduction, regardless of how quickly vessels leave the fishery under the phased reduction regime. Noting that this is not considering instances where vessels exit the fishery at a rate faster than the 2.5% year-on year effort cut.
These results indicate that a significant reduction in effort implemented over a short period of time, even if achieved through a reduction in the level of effort produced by individual vessels, will likely result in an increase in the NPV of rents generated in the fishery over the next 20 years compared with maintaining status quo effort or implementing a gradual effort reduction. However, the total catch over the period of time will be less. This presents managers with the decision -favour economic rents, or supply of tuna.
3.2.3.2. Vessel cost structure. To examine the sensitivity of findings to the assumed cost structure, the level of economic costs required for the one-off cut to generate no additional rent than that achieved under either status quo effort or the phased reduction were estimated. The results indicate that, under the assumption that no vessels exit the fishery, for there to be no difference in the NPV of rents generate between maintaining status quo effort and the one-off effort reduction, an initial economic cost of $0.75/hook is required (Table 3) . That is, the NPV of rents under the one-off cut scenario, where the 38% effort reduction is achieved purely by less hooks being deployed by each vessel, will be greater than that generated under effort status quo unless the initial cost per hook is $0.75 or less. Therefore, unless the fishery cost structure is such that it is appropriate to use a cost per hook of $0.75 or less to reflect the economic conditions of the average vessel, the one-off cut is likely to generate higher levels of rent than maintaining the status quo. If the exit rate per year is just 10% of the initial effort cut, this falls to $0.56/hook. The fall in initial cost per hook necessary for the NPV of rents to be equal between the two scenarios (when vessels exit at a rate of 10%) reflects the additional gains achieved under the one-off cut from the removal of fixed cost per hook compared to the case where no vessel exits. The faster vessels exit the fishery under the one-off cut (i.e. the higher the vessel exit rate), the lower the assumed prevailing cost per hook needs to be to keep NPV of rents generated the same between maintaining status quo effort and the one-off effort reduction.
In contrast, for the NPV of rents to be equal between the one-off and phased reductions under the same vessel exit rate of 2.5% per year, an initial economic costs of $1.07/hook is required. If the rate of decline in vessel numbers under the one-off cut is double that of the phased reduction (i.e. the size of the fleet under the 38% reduction declines at twice the rate under the phased 2.5% reduction), then the initial economic cost required reduces further to $0.80/hook. The argument follows the comparison made with the status quo effort scenario earlier: the additional gains from faster removal of fixed cost from the fishery under the one-off cut compared to the phased reduction requires a higher NPV to be generated under the phased reduction (at a lower cost per hook) than if the two effort regimes had vessels exiting at the same rate. That is, the faster the vessel exit rate assumed for the one-off effort cut, the higher the NPV of rents expected to be generated over the 20-year period. Therefore, a lower initial cost per hook is necessary for the phased reduction to generate the same higher level of NPV of rents to equal that under the one-off effort reduction.
Discussion
An interim target reference point (TRP) for South Pacific albacore of 45%SB F=0 has been proposed by the members of the Forum Fisheries Agency to the Western Central Pacific Fisheries Commission, with the intention of rebuilding the stock in order to increase catch rates to profitable levels seen immediately prior to 2010. In this paper differences in biological and economic outcomes under status quo effort and two effort reduction regimes designed to achieve this TRP within 20 years are examined.
Maintaining effort at 2013 levels is estimated to result in a decline in both the stock status of albacore and in fishery catch rates. The analyses presented here indicate that an immediate 38% one-off reduction in effort will on average rebuild the stock close to the proposed TRP within around 5-7 years, with the stock size then increasing marginally throughout the rest of the 20-year period to the TRP level. A 2.5% year-on-year phased reduction leads to a fairly constant rate of stock rebuilding, with the TRP being reached in the 20th year. At that time, effort is 47.5% lower than 2013 levels.
While the stock rebuilds to the TRP in exactly 20 years under both scenarios, under the phased approach of effort reduction the stock is not in equilibrium with the prevailing level of effort at that time.
Comparing the level of effort after 20 years under the one-off reduction compared to the phased effort reduction (38% lower compared to 47.5% lower), the stock would continue to rebuild under the latter approach after the 20-year period, unless effort were subsequently adjusted. In this case, management would need to transition from the recovery strategy to one that can maintain the stock around the TRP, and hence achieve fishery objectives [22] .
The timescale for rebuilding clearly has a significant impact on the rebuilding strategy and associated level of effort change. Noting the constraints of the stock's biology and prevailing ecology, managers may shorten, or extend, rebuilding timeframes based upon considerations of the level of social and economic impacts they are willing to endure [20, 22] . The length of the rebuilding period also has scientific and management implications. As the length of time for rebuilding increases, the biological advice that can be provided becomes increasingly uncertain, given for example uncertainty in future recruitment levels and the form of the stock recruitment relationship. In turn, in reality, the assumption of perfect implementation of any rebuilding plan is unlikely [26] , and corrections needed to achieve recovery within the desired timeline will be necessary. Ideally, this would be through a formalised 'management procedure' such as that agreed in order to recover southern bluefin tuna, which can be tested for robustness against uncertainty [8] .
The different patterns of effort reduction and stock recovery result in significantly different outcomes in the fishery in terms of both catch landed and economic rent generated. Over the 20-year period, both of the examined effort reduction regimes will result in a lower catch in the southern longline fishery but an increase in economic rents, in comparison to maintaining status quo effort. The catch forgone over the 20 years for the one-off cut is around 143,000 mt for albacore (or 262,000 mt for total catch), and for the phased reduction this is 98,000 mt for albacore (or 175,000 mt for total catch). Estimated fishery rents increase significantly under both effort reduction regimes compared with status quo effort. If the size of the fleet is reduced in direct proportion to the effort cut, so that the level of effort produced Table 3 Initial cost per hook required to achieve the same NPV of rents as the one-off effort cut under given vessel exit rates.
Scenarios
Required cost per hook
Effort status quo
Where no vessels exit under one-off cut $0.75 Where vessels exit at 3.8% of initial fleet size (10% of effort cut) $0.56
2.5% Phased reduction
Where vessels exit at 2.5%of initial fleet size $1.07 Where vessels exit at 5% of initial fleet size $0.80 per vessel remains the same, the NPV of rents over the period are estimated to be around $786 million higher under the one-off effort cut and $400 million higher under the phased reduction. Even if the size of the fleet does not adjust, or adjusts at a very slow rate, significantly higher rent is estimated to be generated in the fishery than if status quo effort is maintained. For example, if under the one-off effort reduction no vessels leave the fishery resulting in effort per vessel falling by 38%, the NPV of rents over the period is still $303 million greater than if status quo effort is maintained. Similarly, the one-off cut produces higher increases in the NPV of rents under any realistic assumption of vessel withdrawal. The exit rate for the one-off reduction only needs to be 1% or more of the initial fleet size per annum to outperform the phased reduction. This indicates that if vessels are forced to exit the fishery the additional NPV of rents generated under the one-off reduction by vessels that remain in the fishery would be sufficient to cover the fixed annual costs of the exiting vessels (including a return on capital of 15%) and still earn a higher return than if status quo effort is maintained, regardless of the forced rate of exit. The same is true when compared to the situation where a 2.5% phased effort reduction is pursued, so long as the exit rate under the one-off reduction is more than 1% of the initial size of the fleet. These results are robust to the likely range of initial cost levels. For example, initial costs of an average vessel before any effort reduction need to be at most $0.75/hook for the NPV of rents under status quo effort to be equal to or greater than that generated under the one-off 38% reduction. Otherwise the one-off cut is likely to generate higher levels of rent than maintaining the status quo. The initial cost would need to be lower still if vessels do voluntarily exit the fishery. For example, at a rate of 3.8% of the initial fleet size (or at 10% of the effort reduction) the initial costs need to be just $0.56/hook for the NPV of rents to be same under status quo effort and the one-off effort reduction. It should be noted that while variations in cost per hook is considered in this paper, prices were not varied to reflect any potential changes in size composition of landed catch that might arise from effort reduction regimes. For example, if the size of tuna caught increases as biomass recovers, then revenue generated may increase from higher prices associated with larger fish. This suggests that the results presented in this study are relatively conservative as the gains in fishery rent could be larger if size effects are considered. This could be examined in more detail in future work.
The results of the analysis indicate that while the biological outcome of each approach is comparable -the stock recovers to the candidate TRP within the 20-year timescale, achieving that objective will require significant effort and catch reductions. The size of the catch reduction is, however, dependent on the size and timing of effort controls. This analysis estimates that the catch forgone in the southern longline fishery under a phased 2.5% reduction would be around 98,000mt for albacore (175,000 mt for total catch), or around one third less than that which would be forgone under a one-off 38% effort reduction. On the other hand, the analysis also indicates that while both effort reduction regimes will improve the economic performance of the southern longline fishery, a large one-off reduction is likely to result in the fishery generating significantly higher rents (Table 4) .
The question is then whether an effort reduction regime that results in less catch being forgone but lower levels of rent generated is preferable to one that sees higher levels of forgone catch but generates higher rents, given that at the end of the day they will both rebuild the stock to the desired level. These different consequences for catch and fleet profitability need to be considered relative to the different objectives fishery stakeholders may have for the principal Pacific Island southern longline fishery. Candidate objectives identified by fishery managers include to'maximise SIDS revenues from resource rents', 'maximise catch', and ensure'food security in developing states' [28] . The first relates to the profitability outcomes for fishing vessels, while the last two can be related to higher overall catch levels, e.g. to maintain employment in catch processing industries and to allow the partitioning of target catch and bycatch for food security purposes [19] .
Viewed from this perspective, managers for whom the first objective is most important would favour either of the management interventions and resulting effort reductions over the status quo option, with the oneoff large effort reduction being preferred. Those for whom the second set of fishery and social objectives prevail may, in the near-term, favour maintaining status quo effort that leads to higher catch levels over the period, at the risk of the stock declining below the limit reference point. When trading off these competing sets of objectives, and ensuring stock sustainability, the phased approach to effort reduction that eliminates stock risk and offers reduced foregone catch, but lower profitability over most of the 20 years, might offer a way forward.
These trade-offs between maximising fishery rent and social benefits are not specific to only Pacific Island countries, but are present in management decisions in various fisheries around the world whether explicitly defined or otherwise [13] . However, despite the diverse ways in which decision makers choose to manage fisheries (e.g. through output control or effort management schemes), many fisheries in the world are managed to biomass targets based largely on biological considerations (and indirectly to economic or social considerations, e.g. through maximising yield). As illustrated in this analysis, even when different management regimes achieve the same biomass target over the selected projection period, the economic impacts along the trajectory paths and at the end of the projection period can vastly differ. This highlights the importance of moving beyond a purely biological stockbased focus when providing management advice. The benefits of incorporating the economic objectives for fisheries within the WCPO has already been demonstrated through the huge success of the Vessel Day Scheme in terms of rent generation for the tropical purse seine skipjack fishery, especially when compared to the economic performance of skipjack fisheries in other tuna RFMOs like the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission and the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas.
Assumptions were made within the biological projection approach. While uncertainty is incorporated by projecting from the 'grid' of assessment models that capture alternative stock dynamics (e.g. the form of the stock recruitment relationship), and hence results represent what might be expected 'on average' across that uncertainty, we do not capture the year-to-year variability in future recruitments. In turn, catchability is assumed constant into the future. While it is difficult to predict trends in future catchability, 'effort creep', where technological developments within the fishery improve fishing performance, would lead to increased stock impacts from a given level of fishing effort, and hence would require greater effort reductions to achieve the target. As noted earlier, continued monitoring of the rebuilding strategy would be required to enable corrections to be made to bring the stock trajectory back on track, or consider whether changes are required in the event of good recruitments, for example [22] .
It is important to note that the current evaluation ignores some of the social and wider economic consequences that may result from management interventions, particularly those interventions of the scale of the one-off effort reduction examined here. As noted by Mardle and Pascoe [11] , the long-term benefits that result from this management intervention (both biological and economic), imply a potential shortterm reduction in employment and revenue. For the fishery, we note above that the additional NPV of rents generated under the one-off reduction by vessels that remain in the fishery would be sufficient to cover the fixed annual costs of the exiting vessels (including a return on capital) while also benefiting those remaining in the fishery. However, a fuller consideration of wider objectives, such as regional employment, may be warranted under this scenario.
This study shows that economic considerations are an important part of fisheries management [13] . This message has also been highlighted particularly by Holland [15] in determining optimal rebuilding strategies. Despite this, many countries in the world do not take economic considerations in rebuilding plans, with New Zealand and Australia among the few that do. While New Zealand fisheries target MSY under their Fisheries Act (1996), rebuilding strategies take a more flexible approach to incorporate broader goals such as socio-economic considerations [14] . Under the Harvest Strategy Policy (2007), the target biomass and fishing intensity levels for Australian Commonwealth fisheries are required to be consistent with achieving MEY [16] . In the case of rebuilding stocks, paths to achieve B MEY for stocks at B MSY are permitted to be slower than rebuilding paths from B LIM to B MSY as to account for "appropriate balance between short term losses and longer term economic gains" [16] . As demonstrated in this study, incorporating the economic consequences of management action in a stock rebuilding context provides important additional information for decision making on the trade-offs involved in alternative pathways that achieve the same target biomass level and should be considered even for fisheries that have purely biological based targets. Therefore, it is important to gather the relevant price and cost information to support these types of analyses, however, this critical but potentially commercially sensitive component of a fishery data collection framework is often overlooked. Prioritisation of efforts to collect these data is therefore recommended to improve scientific advice. Less rent generated.
Decline in food security. Potential for decline in access revenue captured.
